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1. Executive Summary 
 
From its inspired beginnings in 2001, the Sudan Landmines Information and Response 
Initiative (SLIRI) has had the potential to become an influential mine action organization 
with the capacity to use the mine action platform for engaging Sudan’s adversaries in a 
peacebuilding dialogue. It is the only non-partisan indigenous organization in the 
country.  Its first location – or Sector Operations Centre (SOC) as the site offices have 
been called - and the most innovative has been in the Nuba Mountains, where shortly 
after the cease-fire in January 2002 SLIRI first introduced two offices working in tandem 
on either side of the conflict line for collecting information about victims and mined 
areas. Information was collected by pairs of field workers drawn from both sides of the 
conflict. From the Nuba Mountains, SLIRI expanded, establishing 15 Sector Operation 
Centres (SOCs) throughout the country as the programme grew, operating simultaneously 
in Government controlled areas and SPLM controlled areas. Its ultimate ambition was to 
have SOCs in all major areas of the country with sub-sector locations where basic 
landmine surveys would contribute to protecting the population and to assisting mine 
clearance in setting priorities. 
 
Unlike the other national NGOs dedicated to mine action SLIRI has actively avoided 
affiliation with either side of the conflict. The Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(SCBL) and Sudan Association for Combating Landmines (JASMAR) both operate under 
the authority of the Government. Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) operates under 
the authority of the SPLM. But SLIRI, by its original conception and by conviction, has 
remained politically non-aligned. This has facilitated its work on both sides of the 
conflict line, in Government-controlled and SPLM-controlled areas, and neutrality has 
been an asset.  
 
Neutrality has had its price. In order to accomplish its ultimate objective of becoming a 
legitimate nationwide organization with some permanence, SLIRI needed to become a 
full-fledged NGO and be recognized as such by both the Government and the SPLM. 
This was a commitment that Landmine Action and SLIRI made to its principal sponsor, 
the European Community. The difficulty was that, originally, neither the Government nor 
the SPLM were willing to accord legitimacy to an organization that stood opposed to the 
separate interests and the mutual suspicion that has defined Sudanese politics for at least 
20 years. SLIRI did finally succeed in being registered as an NGO by the SPLM but not 
by the Government in Khartoum.    
 
Attempts to achieve official recognition and registration on both sides of the conflict have 
a long history. When the Government was approached three years ago to initiate the 
registration process, its National Mine Action Office proposed that the SLIRI programme 
be attached to an existing organization, JASMAR, a mine action NGO operating under its 
authority. SLIRI advisors declined. Affiliation with the Government’s JASMAR might 
have guaranteed registration but it would have compromised the ideal of neutrality, and it 
was a matter of principle that SLIRI be an indigenous, non-aligned organization. 
Resentment lingers among ranking Government officials whose memories are long, and 
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there seems little question nowadays that from this bed of lingering resentment has 
sprung a number of minor grievances which come up whenever the question of SLIRI’s 
NGO registration is raised.  
 
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which has become an increasingly 
influential fixture in the mine action landscape in the Sudan over the past three years, 
might have defended SLIRI and supported its ideal, but it did not. In 2003, SLIRI’s early 
advisors argued, perhaps rather boldly, that SLIRI should be the custodian of the 
country’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), the data 
processing and record keeping function maintained by most mine affected countries. 
UNMAS’ Programme Manager at the time took offense at the proposal. He subsequently 
went even farther by keeping SLIRI from having any access to IMSMA at all. Tempers 
ran high and here again resentment lingers. Without access to the international data 
management standard, SLIRI was obliged to develop its own software for recording its 
survey data. SLIRI’s software was incompatible with the record keeping function kept by 
UNMAS, and this incompatibility has given UNMAS staff reason to disparage SLIRI’s 
efforts, to take issue with SLIRI’s use of the wrong kind of forms, and belittle the quality 
of SLIRI’s data.  
 
UNMAS works closely with the Government’s National Mine Action Office. It is 
difficult to say whether this close collaboration with the Government has had a role in 
UNMAS’ disinclination to support SLIRI, though many of those who were interviewed 
suspected this to be the case. UNMAS shares an office complex with the Government’s 
National Mine Action Office and when the Government took the decision to prohibit 
SLIRI’s use of GPS equipment, UNMAS supported the decision knowing this would 
cripple SLIRI’s ability to provide reliable data. It matters little that the dispute between 
SLIRI and UNMAS sprang partially from personality differences or that these differences 
might have been resolved with a little more patience on both sides; the result has been 
that both the Government’s National Mine Action Office and UNMAS, separately and 
together, have contributed to containing SLIRI’s attempts to become a nationwide NGO.   
 
Landmine Action might have helped SLIRI avoid these difficulties with the Government, 
the SPLM and UNMAS had its country directors been more tactful, though this is far 
from certain. The Landmine Action country directors struck a firm posture toward the 
Government’s NMAO and made contact with UNMAS only when it was absolutely 
necessary. Only modest attempts were made by Landmine Action’s country director in 
2004 to mend fences, even when a new UNMAS programme manager arrived in 2003 
who was more supportive of SLIRI’s ideals, and who might have done more than his 
predecessor.   
 
Landmine Action and SLIRI faced a financial dilemma in early 2005 that would have far-
reaching consequences and compound SLIRI’s difficulties. The second tranche of 
funding from the EC was inexplicably delayed. The delay had little effect on the 
demining operators whose funding was otherwise assured, but it did take its toll on 
SLIRI’s survey and community liaison activities, which relied on EC funding. Ten weeks 
went by without resolution and Landmine Action was obliged to cut back its 
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commitments to SLIRI for its work in the communities and it did so just as SLIRI was 
completing the compilation of information using the United Nations’ IMSMA format. 
The timing could not have been worse. The United Nations became even more 
entrenched in its distrust of SLIRI. In September 2005, SLIRI’s dynamic Sudanese 
director in Kadugli left to take a position elsewhere.  
 
A larger organization with more human and financial resources than Landmine Action 
might have found a way to bridge financing between payments. Landmine Action could 
not and subsequently took the decision to bring in a larger partner for SLIRI. By mid 
2005 Landmine Action had begun negotiations with HALO Trust to take over Landmine 
Action’s role as international partner for all of SLIRI’s Sector Operations Centres in the 
SPLM area and three in the Government area. SLIRI’s name has changed in these 
locations to Sudan Landmine Response (SLR) and it remains to be seen whether the 
name change is part of a significant change in strategy. A transition period presently 
prevails.   
 
From the beginning, Landmine Action set its sights for SLIRI high but no one, not even 
those who have sought to contain SLIRI, would deny the boldness of SLIRI’s vision or 
the value that SLIRI brings to the country. The Government continues to promise that 
registration is still possible and claims to support the SLIRI ideal but new excuses are 
perpetually found to prevent SLIRI’s registration as an NGO. UNMAS, at the national 
level, regards SLIRI as a lost cause and in the Nuba Mountains, some UNMAS staff 
disparage the value of SLIRI’s efforts as being “worse than zero.” It is difficult to 
understand UNMAS’ readiness to take such outspoken exception to SLIRI’s work. It is 
even more difficult to understand why UNMAS would do anything to diminish SLIRI’s 
presence in the Sudan.   
 
This evaluation report argues that Landmine Action and other associated international 
partners should take measures to rescue SLIRI from its present decline, to resurrect 
SLIRI’s reputation with UNMAS and to mend fences with the Government as it 
continues to seek official recognition. The EC continues to actively support registration 
for SLIRI, a sign that the EC maintains an interest in supporting the SLIRI ideal. The fact 
that SLIRI no longer functions in the way it was envisaged does not mean it should not 
do so or that it was not a good idea or that it did not do well. It has done well even if its 
present circumstances are poor testimony. SLIRI functioned well in Phase I of European 
Community funding and continued to function well, against some odds, in 2004 during 
the first year of the European Community’s Phase II funding. Its accomplishments are 
considerable especially considering the difficulties experienced in providing data 
according to UNMAS’ standards. A neutral, national indigenous organization is a viable 
and feasible ideal, and even if these first three and a half years have had disappointments, 
they have provided lessons for avoiding the risks that a non-partisan, national institution 
must navigate if it is to serve as a platform for implementing a peacebuilding campaign 
through mine action.    
 
A final, more general impediment has stood in SLIRI’s way as it stands in the way of 
other innovative mine action organizations globally. Two divergent cultures divide mine 
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action into separate camps. One is a military culture, and this military paradigm supports 
high-cost, highly centralized military managed endeavors that conduct mine clearance as 
stand-alone programs, as ends in themselves. An alternative paradigm regards mine 
action to be less a military than a civilian or community matter whose ultimate purpose is 
broader than mine clearance alone. The alternative paradigm places a significant measure 
of authority over mine action in the hands of local officials or village leaders who are 
encouraged to regard mine action as one among a menu of development needs: water 
access, small loans, agricultural advice or education. This civilian, or community-based 
approach that SLIRI espouses is suspect among military-trained staff in general, and the 
military-inclined personnel at UNMAS in Khartoum particularly who regard giving 
responsibility over disposing of the instruments of war too hazardous or too complex a 
task for a local organization.  
 
SLIRI is an idea whose time has perhaps not yet come, but whose time may come soon. 
Funds will diminish for high-cost mine action. Donors will prefer to support mine action, 
especially in lightly contaminated countries such as the Sudan, through community 
development schemes managed through UNDP or international NGOs and will become 
increasingly wary of investing in the centralized UNMAS operating procedures that insist 
on quality standards that no local government could ever afford on its own. Sudan will 
need an organization like SLIRI, even if its capacity does not yet measure high by 
international standards.   
 
Organization of the Report 
 
Each of the report’s seven sections, with the exception of this Executive Summary begins 
by raising a central question. Section Two, The Conflict, asks, “what aspects of the 
conflict in the Sudan and the Nuba Mountains bear on Landmine/SLIRI’s capacity to 
promote peace through mine action?”  Each of the subsequent sections, from Section 3 to 
7, address issues specifically raised in the evaluation’s Terms of Reference. Section 3, 
The Survey, addresses the first two issues raised under the Terms of Reference, i.e. “to 
identify strengths and weaknesses in the socio-economic impact and dangerous areas 
surveys as tools for setting priorities in mine action programmes,” and “to gauge if such 
priorities are linked to local peacebuilding needs.” Section 4, Peacebuilding, addresses 
the third issue, “to assess whether socio-economic and dangerous areas surveys can be 
used to design peacebuilding interventions in other areas of the Sudan.” Section 5, 6 and 




Section 8 offers 10 recommendations for how Landmine Action and other international 
partners might now proceed. The central theme of these recommendations is to re-place 
SLIRI on a sound footing and, in future programming, to make institutional strengthening 
of SLIRI the prime objective. It is in the long term interests of the international 
community and the Sudan to restore SLIRI as the only non-aligned indigenous mine 
action organization in the Sudan and to promote SLIRI’s involvement in information 
gathering, community liaison and policy setting at both national and regional levels.    
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It is convenient though only partially correct to describe the conflict in the Sudan as 
between the Arab Islamic North and the African Christian South. These affiliations have 
become the main lines dividing those who oppose each other, though the reasons for the 
conflict are more complex than ethnic or religious or geographic divisions. As in other 
contemporary intra-national struggles, the basis of the conflict has more to do with 
control over resources than ethnic loyalties, and the ethnic divisions are largely an 
overlay on the conflict which, for the most part, involves disputes over oil, water and 
land.   
 
Even though the Nuba Mountains area is geographically situated in the northern half of 
the country, and the Arab/African divisions have not traditionally been a prominent issue, 
this changed in 1986. The trigger was an escalating contest for land between local 
farmers and pastoralist tribes. The pastoralist tribes were armed by the Government 
forces and trained as militias to move against the Nuban farmers cultivating the rich 
valleys and terraced hills in the mountainous Nuba terrain. The Government’s ultimate 
aim was at least in part to force the Nubans off the fertile valley land to make room for 
agribusiness development by supporters of the National Islamic Front and to create a pool 




The Government’s aggression in the Nuba Mountains provided a rallying cry for the 
SPLM among the Nubans, and between 1986 and 1989 the SPLM and its SPLA forces 
established permanent bases in the area. Antagonism escalated. The aggressive 
Arabization policies by the Government, part of its attempt to control the rich Nuban 
valleys, made ethnic identity a major issue among the Nubans, and many Nubans aligned 
themselves with the SPLM to be free from Government expansion. The Government, for 
its part, used growing support for the SPLM as a justification for declaring a jihad and for 
intensifying its offensive.
2
 By the mid-1990’s the Nuba Mountains had become the site of 
intense conflict.  
 
The Government pursued a deliberate “population clearance’ policy in the Nuba 
Mountains area intended to disperse and ultimately relocate the civilian population from 
villages in the Nuba to other parts of the Sudan. Villages were burned in their entirety, 
cattle were stolen, and facilities such as schools and clinics were leveled obliging 
                                                 
1
 International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, Africa Report no 
39, January 2002, p. 144 
2
 Rebecca Roberts and Mads Fridlander, “Preparing for Peace: Mine Action’s Investment in the Future of 
the Sudan,” in K. B. Harpviken and R. Roberts (Eds.) Preparing the Ground for Peace, Mine Action in 
Support of Peacebuilding, Oslo: PRIO, 2004, p. 9 
KEY QUESTION: What aspects of the conflict in the Sudan and the Nuba 
Mountains bear on Landmine Action/SLIRI’s capacity to promote peace through 
mine action? 
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residents to relocate to transit camps outside of the area or in towns, such as Kadugli.
3
 
And by insisting that aid organizations funnel aid only through Khartoum, the 
Government ensured that residents of the razed villages were left with little choice except 
to move to camps where they would receive international assistance rather than rebuild 
villages on their own. Access to food and humanitarian relief was used as a weapon, and 
it was only when UNICEF’s Operation Lifeline Sudan negotiated access to displaced and 
threatened populations in SPLM controlled areas that some relief was available. This 
continued until early 2002 when representatives from Norway, Switzerland and the 
United States, in separate initiatives, brought the warring parties together to agree on a 
cease-fire.  
 
A cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains area was formalized by the US/Swiss Birkenstock 
Agreement on 22 January 2002. A Joint Military Commission established its 
headquarters outside of Kadugli, centrally located in the Nuba Mountains area to 
implement the agreement and to respond to challenges to the cease-fire. It was a model 
peace-making initiative in two ways. It created a political space for peacebuilding 
activities to take place, such as mine action; SLIRI’s mine action programme that 
Landmine Action now manages was one of the first. And it set the pace for other 
peacebuilding agreements. The Machakos Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation 
of Hostilities was signed in Nairobi in October 2002, and both of these agreements 
prohibited parties to the conflict from using landmines. The Nuba Mountains cease-fire 
agreement was a precursor to, and paved the way for, the nation wide Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement in 2005.  
 
Though hostilities continued in pockets of the Nuba Mountains, the ceasefire agreement 
made mine action possible even before there was peace and while a peace agreement was 
being negotiated. The Joint Military Commission needed trained mine clearance services 
to open humanitarian access and before mine clearance could start, basic surveys were 
needed. The Danish NGO, DanChurchAid (DCA) worked closely with the JMC, trained 
demining teams from both Government and SPLM forces and mounted clearance teams 
in mid 2003. SLIRI was established in the Nuba Mountains area from the beginning of 
the cease-fire and provided information on mined areas and landmine casualties. By 
2003, these surveys were being used by SLIRI’s international partner, Landmine Action 
for setting priorities in mine clearance operations. The two mine action programmes in 
the Nuba Mountains – the one under DanChurchAid (DCA) and the other under SLIRI 
and Landmine Action –started in the second year of the Joint Military Commission, well 
before a peace accord had been signed and this has made their experience particularly 
relevant for exploiting the potential of mine action as a peacebuilding activity.  
 
It was originally thought, in 2002 before any mine clearance had been conducted and 
surveys were just beginning, that anti-personnel mines had been widely used.
4
 An initial 
                                                 
3
 International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, Africa Report no 
39, January 2002, p. 145-148 
4
 It appears that the Government forces used anti-personnel mines predominantly to protect the garrisons 
and outposts that they established inside strategically located villages; in these places, landmines were laid 
to stop or funnel the advance of SPLA forces toward a garrison and to force them into a vulnerable 
 7 
estimate of casualties was high. There were reports of over 10,000 mines in the Sudan.  
In 2002, the Government informed IRIN that anti-personnel landmines had caused 1,135 
casualties in the Nuba Mountains in the 11 years between 1989 and 2001, an average of 
107 per year.
5
 When SLIRI first started its own investigations into victims and incidents 
in the Nuba Mountains, inquiries reported 387 casualties from both anti-personnel mines 
or UXOs between 1998 and 2003, 77 per year.
6
  Over the past 18 months when the return 
of displaced persons might have increased the number of accidents, SLIRI has reported 
an average of 3 casualties a month, or 36 per year from landmines and UXOs, half the 
number reported earlier by SLIRI and a third reported by the Government. As 
information is accumulated and done so with more care, the estimates of the number of 
victims and the number of landmines and UXOs are likely to diminish further.  
 
Estimates are difficult because the memory of mine placement by army engineers and 
other well-placed informants as well as reports of casualties are often inflated. Inflated 
numbers benefit the Government and the SPLM by luring the sympathy and financial 
assistance of donors into their mine action programmes, over which their respective 
administration keep close control. But it has made it the more difficult to plan for how 
best to tackle the problem. A needs assessment for mine risk education conducted by 
DCA in the Nuba Mountains and published in April 2004 makes the same point: “… 
contamination in the Nuba Mountains is scattered.”
7
 And the number of casualties from 
anti-personnel mines, as a percentage of all explosive remnants of war is rather small, 
less then 20 per cent. Clearly, the danger from anti-personnel mines is somewhat less 
than originally expected.  
 
This matters because the strategy for containing harm to the population depends largely 
on the extent of contamination and if the contamination is modest and restricted to the 
verges of impassible roads or the crests of hillocks, costly manual clearance may be less 
of a viable strategy than educating residents to avoid contaminated areas. Mine clearance 
might well be less of an emergency measure than part of a long term plan to expand 
productive areas, and this means that establishing an indigenous capacity for identifying 
and dealing with dangerous areas is perhaps more important than undertaking costly 
clearance activities with international personnel in the short term. At the very least, 
gathering accurate information and giving good advice to villagers is essential. This is 
where SLIRI had the potential, and still has the potential, for serving a critical role in 
reducing the landmines threat in the Nuba Mountains area.  
                                                                                                                                                 
position. SPLA forces had fewer permanent positions to defend and used anti-personnel mines less 
frequently. Their strategy was to make it difficult for the Government forces to provision their positions, 
denying access by laying anti-tank mines along transport routes. 
5
 IRIN, “Sudan, Food Deliveries Vital for Nuba Mountains,”  May 2002 
6
 SLIRI, “Newsletter” March-May 2003 
7
Uliks Hasanaj and Rune Hjarno Rasmussen, “MRE in the Nuba, A Survey to Assess the Need for Mine 
Risk Education in the Nuba Mountains,” DanChurchAid and UNICEF, April 2004, p. 31 
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SLIRI has collected information in the Nuba Mountains for almost three years and 
throughout this time, SLIRI’s survey activities have covered villages that are under both 
Government as well as SPLM control. The Nuba Mountains survey data is the principal 
concern of this evaluation. Data has also been collected, in six other survey sites in 
Government controlled areas, and this data set covers mine action information 
exclusively in Government controlled locations. Since the quality of the data from these 
other six sites bears on SLIRI’s credibility as a survey organization, it is reviewed briefly 
here as well.  
 
There is furthermore another data set from SLIRI survey sites operating under SPLM 
control. Presumably this information has been forwarded to SPLM authorities and, in 
fact, may be kept in SLIRI’s own data base, but neither this evaluation nor other 
interested parties have been able to access this information. 
 
SLIRI’s Nuba Mountains survey was intended to help villages protect themselves, help 
donors identify the areas most in need of mine risk education and help identify the areas 
most in need of clearance. What the initial collection process lacked in expertise, it made 
up in determination and SLIRI staff made a reputation for themselves for their use of 
bicycles and motorbikes to travel to remote mine affected villages even during the rainy 
season. SLIRI maintained a running record of landmine and UXO incidents, detailing the 
type of device, whether the victim was a human, animal or vehicle, whether the human 
was killed or injured and what the victim was doing when the event occurred. SLIRI 
established a network of informants throughout the Nuba Mountain – and in other areas 
under Government control - which has given SLIRI the most complete record available 
from any organization. Up to the end of 2004, SLIRI data had contributed to information 
on 1,269 landmine incidents (see Table 4.3.), which was slightly over 60 per cent of all 




SLIRI’s collection of data during these first two years, roughly July 2002 to August 2004, 
was distinctive because it worked outside of the standard Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) protocols and guidelines. The IMSMA protocols, 
guidelines and software had been denied to SLIRI and in their place, SLIRI advisors were 
obliged to develop their own format for data collection known as the SLIRI Information 
                                                 
8
 Interview with Mohammed Kabir, UNMAS  IMSMA database manager, Khartoum, 24 October 2005 
KEY QUESTIONS:  
(1)What have been the strengths and weaknesses in the socio-economic impact 
and dangerous areas surveys as tools for setting priorities? 
(2) Are the priorities linked to local peacebuilding needs? 
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Management System (SIMS). These two years can be considered a first period in SLIRI’s 
survey activities.  
 
The issue of SLIRI’s access to the data management standard was resolved in July 2004 
when UNMAS provided SLIRI with the IMSMA software and with training to data entry 
field personnel in Kadugli and Kauda in the Nuba Mountains.  By August 2004, SLIRI 
staff began producing information in the IMSMA format and this ushered in a second 
period of survey work.  
 
Between August and December 2004, SLIRI staff updated its existing material, revisiting 
many of the villages with whom it maintained contact through the SLIRI network and 
producing data on IMSMA forms. UNMAS’s quality assurance staff approved, and 
SLIRI was finally able to participate fully in a UNMAS controlled nation-wide system of 
data gathering. The results of this intensive four month effort constitute the output of the 
second survey period. Work on this second period was cut short in January 2005 when 
the second tranche of EC funding for Landmine Action was delayed forcing Landmine 
Action to stop allocations to SLIRI’s survey activities.   
 
There are, then, two sets of Nuba Mountains SLIRI data over approximately two and a 
half years, collected in a first and second period. The first includes the data collected on 
SLIRI’s own forms and protocols between July 2002 and August 2004. Since much of 
this data has been incorporated in a 48 village summary, it is referred to here as the 48 
village survey. The second includes data collected with IMSMA forms and protocols and, 
up to the time when funding was stopped, SLIRI had accumulated data on 64 villages. 




The SLIRI data has been used differently for setting mine action priorities in the first and 
the second periods. 
 
First Period, July 2002-August 2004 
 
A complete compilation of SLIRI’s first period data has never been assembled. Because 
it was not in the IMSMA format, only portions of it have been entered into the national 
UNMAS database. An overview of the first period data must now be gleaned from SLIRI 
newsletters, quarterly reports and files where updates were given regularly.  
 
During SLIRI’s first survey period, Landmine Action advisors established a school for 
deminers in Tillo, a small settlement outside of Kadugli. The first set of 26 deminers had 
completed their training by February 2003 and were preparing for clearance operations. 
A list of villages needing emergency clearance was based on the data collected by SLIRI 
in the initial months of its research. Landmine Action drew on this SLIRI data in 
conducting what was referred to as an Accelerated Village Data Confirmation 
programme, in which the SLIRI data was verified and dangerous areas confirmed.  Forty-
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eight villages were selected from the total number of villages on which SLIRI had 
documentation.   
 
Thirty-five of these villages were thought to be contaminated by landmines and UXOs. 
From these thirty-five villages, between 10 and 15 villages were identified as most 
urgently in need of clearance and the village leaders - Emirs, Omdas and Sheikhs - were 
convened by SLIRI in Kadugli to discuss among themselves which should receive 
attention first. Information on village contamination was presented by Landmine 
Action/SLIRI staff. After a lengthy discussion, the group of village leaders came to the 
unanimous decision that village Korongo Abdala should be cleared first followed by the 
village Katsha.
9
 The village leaders valued these consultations.
10
 Landmines and UXO 
contamination became a collective, village-level responsibility in ways it had not been 
before, and the process guaranteed that the choice was made for humanitarian, not for 
military or political reasons. As it turned out, the priorities were probably appropriate. 
Clearance in the highest priority village, Korongo Abdala, removed 33 mines and 47 
UXOs over a period of approximately 11 months, the highest number recorded so far in 
the Nuba Mountains for a specific village area.  
 
Second Period, August – December 2004 
 
Using IMSMA protocols and guidelines, and with UNMAS training, the SLIRI two- 
person teams in Kadugli (Government controlled) and Kauda (SPLM controlled) 
compiled an updated list of 64 affected villages in the Nuba Mountains. The raw data on 
these 64 villages was forwarded to UNMAS in Khartoum where it was assessed and, 
using a ‘scoring system’ that assigns numeric values for a range of variables, UNMAS 
assigned a composite ‘impact’ score that serves as the basis for giving an ‘impact-based’ 
priority ranking. A sample of the raw data on 64 villages can be found in Annex 1.
11
 
UNMAS’ summary of this raw data using its scoring system has been labeled ‘Light 
Impact Survey Priority and Weights by Village’ and is found in Annex 3. The scoring 
system is in Annex 2. 
 
UNMAS has now assumed full responsibility for setting clearance priorities in the Nuba 
Mountains areas. Village leaders are not consulted. Presumably the priorities assigned in 
UNMAS’ Light Impact Survey Priority and Weights by Village, based on SLIRI’s 64 
village survey and analyzed in Khartoum by UNMAS database managers have been used 
by UNMAS Kadugli in setting these priorities, though UNMAS Kadugli has not 
acknowledged doing so.    
 
                                                 
9
 Details about Katsha and other villages mentioned in this report can be found in Annex 1, a compilation 
of information on casualties and mine areas for 64 villages. 
10
 Interviews were conducted with village leaders in Korongo Abdala who had participated in the 
consultations. 
11
 This was provided by UNMAS Kadugli. It is a version of the raw data that has been extensively edited 
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UNMAS has recently assigned Landmine Action an additional clearance operation in the 
SPLM controlled village of Koyea. Koyea is an abandoned village where only six 
households still live, reputed to have been heavily mined because of its proximity to an 
SPLM controlled airstrip. The landmines, however, pose little immediate threat to a 
population that has, for the most part, evacuated the place. After almost a half-year of 
clearance operations, the teams have found only two mines in an area where UNMAS’ 
surveyors suspected as many as 200. This raises the question whether a village 
consultation, similar to the one conducted by Landmine Action and SLIRI in 2003, would 
have perhaps not regarded Koyea as a priority and chosen another location where the 
threat to human lives was more immediate.
12
    
 
SLIRI Data for Six Other SOC Sites in Government Controlled Areas up to Mid-
2004 
 
In July 2004, SLIRI forwarded a compact disk to UNMAS of data assembled by the 7 
Sector Operation Centres maintained by SLIRI in Government controlled areas. The 
database included information on roads, villages, other mined areas, human casualties 
and other incidents.  UNMAS’ data management specialist in Khartoum conducted a 
review with lessons for improving data quality. Three of the summary tables which the 
data yielded are provided here, on (1) mined areas, (2) land use of blocked areas and (3) 
victims. In all cases, the data has been cross-tabulated with location.  
 
Table 4.1.summarizes the number of identified mined areas for each of six states.  
 
Table 4.1. Number of Mined Areas by Location 
State Number 
Bahr Al Jabal 31 
Eastern Equatoria 7 
Jonglei 2 
Red Sea 100 
South and West Kordofan 
1 
53 
Upper Nile 7 
Total 200 
  Source: Mohammed Kabir, “Data Presentation: SLIRI North,” UNMAS 
  
1
South and West Kordofan cover the Nuba Mountains area. 
 
Table 4.2. re-arranges information for all mined areas to classify them by how the mined 
area is normally or potentially used. This gives a rough idea of the social and economic 
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Table 4.2. Classification of Mined Areas by Land Use 
 
Reported Usage Number 
Agriculture 6 
Agriculture-forest 1 
Agriculture – grass and wood collection 25 
Agriculture - grazing 34 
Agriculture – grazing, grass and wood 2 
All agriculture uses 6 
Forest only 1 
Forest and grazing 1 
Grass/wood collection only 2 
Grazing only 67 
Not used for productive purposes 1 
Residential or household garden 1 
Unspecified 53 
Total 200 
  Source: Mohammed Kabir, “Data Presentation: SLIRI North,” UNMAS 
 
The data on victims contained 1597 incidents but only 1269 were listed in the IMSMA 
data base since 328 incidents were submitted without the location being properly 
identified. Those victims with locations identified are arranged in the following table.  
 
Table 4.3. Number of Landmine Victims by Location 
 
State Number of victims 
Western Bahr El Ghazal 321 
Nuba Mountains 299 
Warrap 188 
Bahr Al Jabal 149 
Red Sea 121 
Upper Nile 94 
Jonglei 45 
Eastern Equatoria 20 
Northern Bahr El Ghazal 16 
Lakes 12 
Western Equatoria 4 
Total  1269 
  Source: Mohammed Kabir, “Data Presentation: SLIRI North,” UNMAS 
 
While there have been some concerns about how data is presented, generally the SLIRI 
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Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
The intrinsic value of SLIRI, as a non-partisan indigenous organization is reiterated 
throughout this report and is repeated here. There are very few organizations in the 
Sudan, if any, which do not have some stake in the conflict and in the institutions that 
perpetuate it. SLIRI is an exception. Its non-partisan character is its strength. This has 
also been problematic for SLIRI which must work closely with a number of other 
organizations, North and South, and all of them in order to survive, have implicitly or 
explicitly made their partisan alliances. It is laudable that SLIRI was eventually 
recognized by the SPLM authorities, though not without difficulties. And it is perfectly 
understandable that, in part because of SPLM’s recognition and in part because of 
SLIRI’s principled neutrality that the Government National Mine Action Office has so far 
rejected SLIRI’s application for NGO registration.   
 
SLIRI’s competence as a survey organization raises a different matter. Mined area 
surveys serve various purposes. They serve to identify villages where mine risk education 
and follow up for victim assistance are required, and the SLIRI survey did this. Any 
organization that wanted to know which villages needed a mine risk education 
programme or victim assistance would find it in SLIRI records. Surveys are also expected 
to serve a more rigorous purpose. They may be expected to identify with some precision 
and technical savvy the limits of mine fields, the intensity of contamination, the affected 
population and the threat to water access and livestock, and the claim has been that the 
SLIRI data does not provide this level of precision. A cursory examination of SLIRI’s 
data indicates that this claim may be partially, though only partially true. Even if it is 
true, very little evidence has been provided to make the case.  
 
The claim comes primarily from UNMAS staff, some of whom are outspoken on the 
issue. SLIRI’s most recent 64 village data set and the priority setting based on this data 
seems to serve as one of the bases for setting clearance priorities in the Nuba Mountains. 
The performance of the survey activity was appreciated by UNMAS personnel in Kadugli 
at the time.
14
 The UNMAS staff may nevertheless have their reasons for discounting the 
quality of SLIRI’s data and for disparaging SLIRI as an institution, and some of these 
reasons may include the following.  
 
1. In 2003 when there was very little information on landmine/UXO contamination in the 
Sudan, Landmine Action’s advisor,
15
 who had been instrumental in founding SLIRI, 
envisioned SLIRI as the national custodian of landmine information in the Sudan. The 
Programme Manager of UNMAS at the time took umbrage at his suggestion to have an 
indigenous organization assume functions which, in his view, were the exclusive 
responsibility of the United Nations. The legacy of hard feelings has not entirely 
disappeared. When finally SLIRI had no choice but to relent, UNMAS Program Manager 
denied SLIRI access to the IMSMA software. For SLIRI’s first two years, its data 
followed a different format and UNMAS data managers resented, and resent still, the 
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extra work required to make it compatible with theirs. An indication of this legacy has 
been that none of SLIRI’s extensive involvement in mine risk education has been entered 
into the Nuba Mountains mine risk education database, a particularly surprising omission 
given the observation by a recent UNICEF financed study of DanChurchAid in the Nuba 
Mountains that SLIRI has had the most advanced surveillance system, network and 




2. Beginning in 2003, SLIRI was the only organization in the Sudan collecting 
information in areas controlled by the Government as well as by the SPLM. At one point, 
there were eight SLIRI Sector Operations Centres collecting information in SPLM areas. 
The SPLM authorities were reluctant to allow the information to be forwarded to 
UNMAS or circulated widely, convinced as they were of the close links between 
UNMAS and Government institutions. UNMAS staff has been displeased about this and 
has assumed that SLIRI, itself, has been a factor in restricting their access to data from 
the SPLM controlled areas.  
 
3. There may be a tendency among some UNMAS personnel
17
 to distrust ‘community 
based’ approaches to mine action. This has been mentioned by other commentators, and 
it is worth noting that UNMAS has hesitated, in the past, to embrace a broader, more 






There are different opinions about whether SLIRI’s data meets the standards upheld by 
UNMAS. But there is agreement that SLIRI has functioned well in spite of substantial 
odds; that SLIRI produced considerable data in many parts of the country where no data 
had previously been collected; that this data has ably served to set appropriate clearance 
priorities; and that SLIRI had the most effective network for providing mine-action 
services such as mine risk education in the Nuba Mountains.  
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A small body of literature has recently examined how mine action contributes to reducing 
conflict by promoting peacebuilding. Mine clearance obviously removes the instruments 
of war, often quite publicly, and the demonstration of their removal and destruction is a 
powerful show of the strong backing for advocates of peace.
19
 But there are other ways, 
four in particular, that have recently been cited to press the case for mine action’s 
potential for encouraging peaceful dialogue. They fall under the broad headings: (1) 
Governance and Political Framework, (2) Reconciliation and Justice, (3) Socio Economic 
Foundations and (4) Security.
20
    
 
Each of these four areas involves strategies for reducing conflict and building peace in 
the context of mine action. The strategies are practical programming guides, but they are 
also useful as a template or standard in guiding inquiry about whether mine action 
programmes have realized fully their capacity to promote peace. They are, in this sense, 
four areas in which a programme such as the Landmine Action/SLIRI one, has to perform 
well. Column 1 of Table 6.1 gives these four areas and beside them, in column 2, are 
concrete initiatives
21
 that fall under each of them. Column 3 gives the indicators, adapted 
for this evaluation, to be considered in judging the Nuba Mountains Landmine 
Action/SLIRI mine action own peacebuilding programme.  
 
Targets or objectives for each of these indicators could be expressed for each one, and 
they could also be given a numerical value in order to judge actual achievements against 
these objectives. This would have been too complex for such a brief evaluation. Instead, 
the performance of the programme on each of the indicators is ranked between 1 and 5 
and the rankings totaled for all indicators to give a shorthand assessment of the 
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KEY QUESTION: Are the socio-economic and dangerous areas surveys 
effective for peacebuilding interventions in the Nuba Mountains and in other 
areas of the Sudan? 
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peacebuilding programme as a whole. The total rankings and their rationales are given at 
the end of this section and summarized in Table 6.5. 
 
 













• Institution and competence 
building: planning, diplomacy, 
advocacy and management 
• Human rights and IHL 
• Role for active and critical civil 
society 
• Engagement with non-state 
actors 
I. Successful creation of a non-
partisan institution at the national 
level 
II. Indigenization of a sustainable, 
capable institution at both national 
and regional levels 
III. Contribution to an active and 
critical civil society at the regional 
and national level 
2.Reconciliation 
and Justice 
• Dialogue between former 
opponents 
• Opening up of public space 
• Trauma therapy and healing – 
victim assistance 
• Facilitation of evidence 
gathering 
IV. Increased cross-lines dialogue 
between former opponents   
V. Creation of a ‘community of 
common concern’ among 
groups/villages across conflict 
lines 
  
3. Security • Marking, fencing and clearance 
• DDR, stockpile destruction, 
removal of instruments of war, 
employment of combatants 
• Engage with SALW challenges 
• Increased human security 
VI. Areas marked and cleared and 
stockpiles destroyed 
VII. Casualties and other 




• Physical reconstruction 
• Economic reconstruction 
• Infrastructure of health and 
education 
• Repatriation and return of IDPs 
• Food security 
VIII. IDPs returned 




This section assesses the Landmine Action/SLIRI Nuba Mountains programme as a 
peacebuilding endeavor using the indicators in column 3 as guidelines. As suggested in 
the Terms of Reference, this section also raises the question, in its conclusion, of whether 








Governance and Political Framework 
 
I. Successful creation of a non-partisan institution at the national level 
 
The original concept of SLIRI was explicitly to serve as an “indigenous, grass-roots 
organization working with both sides of the conflict...”
22
 Over the past 4 years, SLIRI has 
stood for a non-aligned cross-lines mine action body, and it differs from Sudan’s other 
indigenous mine action organizations in this regard, notably JASMAR (Sudan 
Association for Combating Landmines) under the authority of the Government and OSIL 
(Operation Save Innocent Lives) under the authority of the SPLM. JASMAR and OSIL 
are known publicly as NGOs, though para-government bodies is probably a better term 
since along with other mine action NGOs, these operate under the authority of the 
Government or the SPLM. When the idea of SLIRI as a non-aligned organization 
managing mine action information for the Sudan was conceived, consultations were held 
with JASMAR as a possible partner, but the difficult decision was made and made at 
some cost, to establish a separate, neutral and unaffiliated organization.   
 
A comparison with DanChurchAid (DCA), the other international NGO implementing 
cross-lines mine action in the Nuba Mountains shows SLIRI’s unique character. The 
DCA programme has maintained two demining teams, one from JASMAR and another 
from OSIL and although they trained together, they work separately. While Landmine 
Action/SLIRI trains and employs its own deminers, DCA’s deminers belong 
institutionally to their home NGOs, JASMAR (Government) and OSIL (SPLM). In 
principle, it is a good arrangement though in practice, it has been difficult because the 
loyalty of the deminers remains, inevitably, with their institutional affiliations. DCA has 
lobbied strongly with its two separate partners, JASMAR and OSIL, that the clearance 
teams should be integrated but neither group agrees, and the compromise was reached 
that the JASMAR (Government) teams would work in SPLM mined areas and the OSIL 
(SPLM) teams would work in areas mined by the Government forces.  
 
The compromise points to an instructive difference between DCA and Landmine 
Action/SLIRI. DCA’s peacebuilding initiative is founded on the link that it forges 
between two sides of the conflict, with JASMAR on the one hand and OSIL on the other. 
By contrast, Landmine Action/SLIRI does not seek to reconcile the two sides but rather 
to support a non-aligned organization – SLIRI – whose neutrality makes arbitration 
unnecessary. Landmine Action/SLIRI operates on both sides of the conflict lines because 
it never has been aligned with either side. DCA is in the business of compromise while 
Landmine Action works without affiliation. When DCA takes an initiative, whether to 
expand its operations or to intensify its cross-lines arrangements, agreements must be 
reached between the two sides. DCA is presently re-considering its two-sided affiliation 
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in order to operate as an independent, non-aligned international organization engaging 
deminers as individuals rather than as members of existing, aligned organizations.  
 
DCA’s compromise suggests a more general observation. Sudan’s two sides of the 
conflict see little benefit in fully reconciling at the national level since this would 
undermine their reason for existing. Any effort to integrate teams from the Government 
and SPLM controlled organizations must perpetually face the fact that neither, 
fundamentally, wants the full consequences of reconciliation which would effectively 
dissolve their separate existences and their rationale for making claims, as they do 
separately, on international donors. The decision by Landmine Action/SLIRI to operate 
as an autonomous, strictly non-partisan organization has been a good one. 
 
II. Indigenization of a sustainable, capable institution at both national and regional 
levels 
 
SLIRI sought to be registered as a national NGO by the Government and SPLM for two 
and a half years, between 2002 and 2004, and faced numerous difficulties. Eventually, 
SLIRI did receive official recognition as an NGO from the SPLM, but not from the 
Government side. The Landmine Action/SLIRI project has consequently not succeeded 
in establishing an indigenous institution at the national level. There might have been 
more that Landmine Action could have done to court the authorities more diplomatically 
though in the end, creating an indigenous and neutral mine action organization was bound 
to engender opposition. Neither Landmine Action nor SLIRI can be held too rigorously 
accountable for not being more successful.   
 
III. Contribution to an active and critical civil society at the regional and national level   
 
One of SLIRI’s unique features has been that, unlike other Sudanese mine action NGOs, 
it is a genuine civil society organization. No other mine action NGO in the Sudan is free 
from the authority of either the Government or SPLM authorities who serve as patrons or 
protectors or direct participants. Its only patrons have been its technical advisors and 
international partners, OXFAM UK and Landmine Action, and its funders, principally the 
European Community. In the Nuba Mountains, notably, it has successfully linked villages 
in a network of common interest to generate information and awareness about landmines, 
and at the national level, it has been partially successful in creating an umbrella 
organization operating in the North and South for generating information on casualties 
and dangerous areas.  
 
Reconciliation and Justice 
 
IV. Increased cross-lines dialogue between former opponents   
 




1. It established Sector Operation Centres throughout the North and South and, as a 
consequence, its organizational structure has institutionalized a cross-lines dialogue. 
Branches in one part of the country have interacted frequently with those in another. 
SLIRI’s organization in the Nuba Mountains area has been a microcosm of this national 
character, linking two sites from opposite sides of the conflict line: (1) Kadugli in a 
Government controlled area and (2) Kauda in a SPLM controlled area. Frequent 
interaction between them has likewise constituted a cross-lines dialogue. Convening the 
staff, in whole or in part, produced cross-lines interaction. These meetings only rarely 
involved Government and SPLM authorities, but such meetings did occur first in 2001 at 
SLIRI’s founding and again in May 2004 when ranking officials from the Government 
and the SPLM, funders joined partners and advisors in a meeting to review SLIRI’s 
future directions.  
 
2. SLIRI’s survey activities in the Nuba Mountains are carried out by two-person survey 
teams made up of a Field Officer and an Assistant Field Officer, each from different sides 
of the conflict.   
 
3. Survey team members in a given Sector Operation Centre may conduct investigations 
in both Government and SPLM controlled areas.  
 
V. Creation of a ‘community of common concern’ among groups across conflict lines 
 
What began as a data collection scheme in the Nuba Mountains for SLIRI to assemble 
basic mine action information developed into a far reaching network that by 2005 linked 
over 50 villages in facilitating a flow of information from villages about dangerous areas 
and victims and to villages for the purposes of assisting victims and villagers in 
protecting themselves.  
 
The survey in 2002 and 2003 initially brought SLIRI’s Field Officer in contact with 
numerous villages as information on casualties and dangerous areas was recorded. But as 
the survey continued and as visits were repeated to fill in missing information, stronger 
ties were forged between the SLIRI office in Kadugli and participating villages. By early 
2004, these ties had developed into a loose network and though at the time it had not been 
formalized, SLIRI soon recognized the value of these ties, not only for providing a 
regular flow of information on casualties and mined areas, but also as a vehicle for 
disseminating information on increasing the capacity of villagers to protect themselves.  
 
Once the loose confederation of villages linked by the flow of information took shape, 
SLIRI gave it a formal structure connecting a group of two or three village committees to 
a county or provincial level committee which in turn interacted with state level 
committees all of which regarded Kadugli as their point of contact. At one point, there 
were six state level committees receiving information from (and disseminating 
information to) 21 county committees and these county committees were similarly 
connected to over 50 villages. This made SLIRI potentially the most efficient and 
extensive mine risk education and community liaison organization in the Nuba 
Mountains.   
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In the Nuba Mountains, village affiliations with one side or another of the conflict were 
never that rigid since, for the most part, the demarcation lines drawn for the purposes of 
the 2002 cease-fire were often arbitrary. Some villages with SPLM sympathies ended up 
on the Government side of the line and vice versa. One village may have a Government 
garrison in the town centre while, at the same time, households fly the SPLM flag on the 
periphery. SLIRI’s network and community liaison programme muted the differences 
that were open to question anyway, by assembling a large number of villages on both 




VI. Areas cleared and stockpiles destroyed 
 
Efficiency is a standard performance indicator for most demining operations. It may be 
measured by the number of mines lifted in a certain time period or by square meters 
cleared in a certain time period. A cost benefit analysis is the most demanding of the 
group of techniques that compares inputs into a production system to the goods and 
services deemed critical outputs of the system. The goods and services can be measured 
as immediate outputs by areas surveyed or areas cleared or lengths of road cleared or 
devices lifted, or they can be measured as outcomes, i.e. the value of these new assets 
when used for planting crops or traveling on roads. Increased security of these productive 
resources has considerable peace dividends.  
 
A cost benefit analysis is difficult to apply to mine action programmes because it is 
difficult to measure the quantity of outputs and even more difficult if not near impossible 
to measure the financial value of the outcomes. A more practical approach to measuring 
efficiency is a cost effectiveness analysis which compares the cost or the time required to 
produce the same level of outputs among different organizations, taking account of a 
number of relevant factors such as different clearance assets.  Even here, the exercise can 
be no more than approximate since the analysis requires identifying the data problems, 
making reasonable assumptions for how to address these problems and making sure that 
the results are sensitive to reasonable changes in the assumptions. In this case, given the 
modest amount of information available for different organizations working in the Nuba 
Mountains, the best one can produce is some cost effectiveness conjecture.  
 
The comparison here is between Landmine Action (LMA) and DanChurchAid (DCA) the 
only two humanitarian demining organizations in the Nuba Mountains area. They work in 
comparable terrains, difficult at the best of times, on abandoned roads that may be 
overgrown with tall grass and trees or along the slopes of hills covered with loose rock. 
The Government used anti-personnel mines on hill slopes and ridges to protect village 
garrison against SPLM foot soldiers, and the SPLM soldiers used anti-vehicle mines 
along roads to interrupt Government supply lines. Table 6.2. gives area and devices 




Table 6.2. Comparison of Clearance for Two Organizations in the Nuba Mountains 
Organization Meters
2 
AP cleared AT cleared UXO cleared 
DanChurchAid 99,685 206 3 336 
Landmine Action  54,325 107 1 1490 
Source: UNMAS, Kadugli, November 2005 
 
DanChurchAid has been operating for 2.5 years with 2 teams and has operated, during 
one of these years, with 4 teams, giving a total of 9 team years. During the same period, 
Landmine Action has been operating for 2 years with 2 teams and a half-year with an 
additional two teams, making a total of 5 team years. The disclaimer must be made that 
there are differences in the management and size of teams, the building of team spirit, the 
training, the terrain and the technique of working. A rough comparison is nevertheless 
possible. Table 6.3. summarizes the values for the DCA and Landmine Action teams and 
gives some indication of their comparative cost effectiveness. There appears to be very 
little difference between DCA and Landmine Action in cost effectiveness expressed in 
clearance rates. Otherwise said, Landmine Action meets the same respectable standards 
that other comparable organizations in the area have maintained. 
 









DanChurchAid 9 11,076 60 
Landmine Action 5 10,865 319.6 
 
VII. Casualties and other landmine accidents reduced 
 
It is near impossible to draw a direct connection between areas cleared and the reduction 
of casualties since casualties may increase in the short run as areas are cleared. Residents 
become less cautious and assume areas are safe when they may not be. Clearing land 
attracts the return of IDPs who are less informed than residents and who are more risk-
inclined as they restart their livelihoods by farming in areas that may not be safe. A 
recent study of mine risk education in the Nuba Mountains suggests that returnees are 




SLIRI kept a monthly record of landmine incidents and published these in its quarterly 
report and newsletter. Table 6.4. has been pieced together from these regular reports 
which give the number of landmine incidents recorded for a given time period in the area 
covered by the SLIRI network of villages. The coverage may have changed slightly since 
SLIRI’s network was growing during the year and a half when these records were kept 
and one might well expect casualties to grow as a result. But the more likely reason for a 
greater number of human casualties beginning in the second half of 2004 was the 
growing number of returnees who, after two years of peace in the Nuba were returning to 
their home villages.  
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6.4. Landmine Incidents Recorded by SLIRI in 2004 and 2005 for 6 provinces in the 
Nuba Mountains area 
Date range  No. of 
months 
Humans Animals and 
vehicles 




01-03/2004 3 8 13 21 7/month 
04/2004 1 3 3 6 6/month 
05-07/2004 3 3 8 11 2.3/month 
09-11/2004 3 11 17 28 9.3/month 
01-04/2005 4 21 6 27 9/month 
Source: SLIRI Quarterly Reports and Newsletters, 01/2004-04/2005 
 
The point of these records has little to do with the impact of Landmine Action clearance 
since clearance covered only a restricted area (three villages during this time). The point 
is rather that the interventions by SLIRI, by Landmine Action and DCA in all aspects of 
the mine action involving clearance, education and disposal of ordnances contributed to 
the return of IDPs during this period. Figures vary widely, but a gross estimate would 
suggest that as many as 41,000 IDPs returned to the Nuba Mountains during the period 
covered by these records. What is surprising about these casualty records is not that 
numbers increased slightly, since this is to be expected, but that the numbers have not 




VIII. IDPs returned 
 
An estimated 13,000 IDPs returned to the Nuba Mountain area in 2003, an average of 
1,100 per month. There was only a modest increase in 2004. In 2005, however, for the 
month of May, 4,600 IDPs passed through an IDP checkpoint reportedly returning to 
villages in South Kordofan. This is a four-fold increase over two years previous. At this 
monthly rate, 55,200 can be expected in 2005, and overall, approximately 80,000 will 
have returned between 2003 and 2005. To put this number into perspective, and assuming 
the population of the Nuba Mountains is approximately 1.5 million, total returnees over a 
three year period result in an increase of 5 per cent of the total population.  
 
Questions posed to village leaders in the course of the evaluation confirm this picture. In 
Katsha, a village of 10,000 where Landmine Action maintains a clearance operation, 
village leaders estimated 500 returnees had arrived in the village, equal to five per cent of 
the village population. In Abdala Korongo, a population of 13,000 where Landmine 
Action has also conducted clearance operations, leaders estimated 800 returnees equal to 
six per cent of the population.  
 
The mine clearance operations have been a catalyst for their return since, according to 
informants, the number of returnees was modest until mine clearance started and, once 
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started, the flow increased. Clearance is on-going in Katsha and once completed, 
villagers anticipate a greater number. But the presence of landmines does not appear to 
have been the principal reason for their original departure nor is clearance, in itself, the 
only reason for their return.  Most of the IDPs departed because of the war itself. Cattle 
were stolen and crops were requisitioned for troops, family members were injured, their 
mobility was severely restricted and markets ceased to function. Families left to protect 
themselves generally from the ravages of war, not necessarily from the threat of landmine 
injury. Landmine clearance serves mainly to signal to IDPs that the war is over.  
 
IX. More secure livelihood opportunities 
 
The evaluation interviewed leaders and household members in two villages where 
SLIRI’s survey and community liaison activities collected data and provided some mine 
risk awareness, and where Landmine Action cleared mined areas. The interviewees 
identified three significant impacts: (1) expansion of economic activity resulting from an 
increase in population, (2) a diversification of diets, and (3) an increase in external 
development assistance.     
 
1. Economic activity 
The return of IDPs has had the most significant of all impacts because the increase in 
population has expanded economic activity. In the village of Katsha, a 25 per cent 
increase in the number of small shopkeepers, from 8 to 10 has been the most visible 
indication that conditions have improved, apart from the diversity of products for sale. In 
Abdala Korongo shopkeeper income has increased sharply. While shopkeepers in Katsha 
report a 20 to 25 per cent increase in monthly gross income, in Korongo Abdala where 
the number of returnees is higher, two shopkeeper informants both reported increases 
from 1,000-1,500 dinars per day to over 5,000 dinars per day, a three-fold increase, and 
both of them have expanded their merchandise and the size of their shop.  
 
2. Diet diversification 
None of the respondents linked an increase in arable acres, resulting from mine clearance, 
with an increase in income. The reason was that most of the cleared, arable acres are 
close to the villages, on the hillsides or the slopes within the village that families use for 
their household gardens. These are ‘gebracas” and are different from the sorghum and 
millet fields which are generally far from the village and have not been affected by 
landmine contamination. The value of sorghum grown on these distant fields has indeed 
increased but this is due to poor rains and increased population, not mine clearance. The 
real impact of clearance has come from greater access to family “gebraca” where 
vegetables and fruits are raised for household consumption and now that families feel 
safe in using them, production on these small plots has increased and diets have 
diversified.   
 
3. Development Assistance 
Mine identification and clearance bring in development assistance. In both of the villages, 
Katsha and Abdala Korongo and throughout the areas where mine clearance occurs, local 
and international NGOs now provide clinics, water and other services, services that had 
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not been available before. Mine clearance attracts outside assistance by reducing the 
threat of injury to the staff of charitable organizations.  
 
Peacebuilding Performance Ranking 
 
The summaries, below, justify the ranking of the programme’s performance for each 
indicator on a scale of 1 to 5. Table 6.5. assembles all the summaries in a single table to 
give a composite assessment for all indicators.  
 
Indicator I - Successful creation of a non-partisan institution at the national level: 
Landmine Action/SLIRI has successfully created a non-partisan institution at the national 
level against considerable odds. It was, in conception and as long as it lasted, a 
considerable accomplishment. Performance Ranking = 5 
 
Indicator II - Indigenization of a sustainable, capable institution at both national and 
regional levels:  SLIRI was, at its inception a genuine indigenous organization and 
ideally should have developed as a viable institution more than it has. This did not 
happen. Landmine Action might have done more to promote and strengthen SLIRI 
though clearly there were many factors contributing to its present tenuous status which 
were out of Landmine Action’s control.  Performance Ranking = 3 
 
Indicator III - Contribution to an active and critical civil society at the regional and 
national level : Even if SLIRI does not survive, its presence over a period of four years 
has contributed to promoting activist civil society organizations and raising the standards 
for their performance particularly in its very principled cross-lines strategy. Performance 
Ranking = 4 
 
Indicator IV - Increased cross-lines dialogue between former opponents:  Landmine 
Action has supported SLIRI in its cross-lines activities, in team composition, staff 
meetings and data collection. It might have integrated its own mine clearance teams 
better, but it has not and its support for SLIRI’s activities in general has waned recently. 
Performance Ranking = 4 
 
Indicator V - Creation of a ‘community of common concern’ among groups across 
conflict lines: SLIRI’s creation of a network of villages from both sides of the conflict as 
part of its data collection and community liaison work is a remarkable innovation. It is all 
the more unfortunate that it has not been sustained by either Landmine Action or other 
international organizations in the Nuba Mountains. Performance Ranking = 5 
 
Indicator VI - Areas marked and cleared and stockpiles destroyed: Landmine Action’s 
clearance teams work efficiently,  have been accredited to work on their own and are 
highly regarded by international organizations in the area. Performance Ranking = 5  
 
Indicator VII - Casualties and other landmine incidents reduced: Landmine Action and 
SLIRI programmes have meant that casualties are less than they would have been without 
intervention. But effective casualty reduction requires finding the appropriate balance 
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between clearance operations on the one hand and facilitating the flow of information 
about mined areas and landmine awareness on the other. A better balance remains to be 
achieved. Performance Ranking = 4 
 
Indicator VIII - IDPs returned: IDPs are returning as expected and mine clearance, where 
it has taken place, serves as a catalyst. The programme is working as planned in cleared 
areas. On the other hand, Landmine Action does not appear to have utilized SLIRI’s 
extensive network of community contacts to facilitate IDP returns in the numerous other 
villages to which IDPs are returning without the benefit of mine clearance. Performance 
Ranking = 4 
 
Indicator IX - More secure livelihood opportunities: Mine clearance is one aspect of the 
peace process, which has encouraged the return of IDPs, restored some land and attracted 
development assistance. Landmine Action has recently emphasized clearance more than 
other mine action inputs and where clearance has taken place, the results are promising. 
But aiming to provide clearance on any significant scale is impractical and Landmine 
Action might well have considered that a more balanced approach to mine action might 
have brought benefits to a wider area with more beneficiaries. Performance Ranking =4 
 
Table 6.5. Programme Performance Ranking on Key Indicators (Ranking 1-5) 
Category Ranking 
1. Governance and Political Framework 
I. Successful creation of a non-partisan institution at the national level 5 
II. Indigenization of a sustainable, capable institution at both national and 
regional levels 
3 
III. Contribution to an active and critical civil society at the regional and 
national level  
4 
2. Reconciliation and Justice 
IV. Increased cross-lines dialogue between former opponents   4 




VI. Areas marked and cleared and stockpiles destroyed 5 
VII. Casualties and other landmine incidents reduced 4 
4. Socio-Economic Foundations 
VIII. IDPs returned 4 
IX. More secure livelihood opportunities 4 
Total  38 




The dangerous areas surveys and their application to clearance have served peacebuilding 
in the Nuba Mountains area reasonably well. The analysis summarized in Table 6.5. 
suggests that the programme has accomplished nearly nine-tenths of what might ideally 
have been expected, and this is quite commendable.  
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The Nuba Mountains is unique in the Sudan since it is the setting of Sudan’s first formal 
cease-fire. It is commonly agreed that the Nuba Mountains cease-fire was an uncommon 
success and paved the way for the peace agreement adopted three years later in both the 
Nuba Mountains and for the country as a whole. It was an ideal place for an experimental 
mine action programme to serve the broader purpose of constructing a more peaceful 
environment. 
 
The Landmine Action/SLIRI model of combining surveys, intensive community liaison 
and mine clearance in a single programme and, in particularly, involving the communities 
themselves in most stages of the process, clearly has the potential for working throughout 
the Sudan. It will perform less well where the stakes are higher in prosecuting the conflict 
and where the lines of hostility are more firmly drawn. They were not firmly drawn in the 
Nuba Mountains. In some sense, the Nuba Mountains provided a favourable proving 
ground. There will be other grounds less favourable and while more difficult, these other 
grounds may be more appropriate and more challenging venues for the peacebuilding 
programme.   
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Landmine Action and SLIRI have done more than arrange token encounters and 
collaborations between individuals from opposing sides. They have aimed at investing 
the efforts of adversaries to remove landmines in a single non-aligned institution which 
places its institutional objectives above the separate interests and claims of the two sides. 
The reason why it must be considered successful is not that it granted full recognition to 
both sides of the conflict, but rather explicitly that it did not overtly recognize the 
legitimacy of either of the two sides. SLIRI’s conciliatory potential came from the fact 
that it was one organization, not two, and this gave the phrase ‘cross-lines’ a weightier 
nuance since the objective was to dissolve the two sides, not respect or resolve them.  
 
The principle of non-alignment bestowed on SLIRI its unique character as well as an 
element of controversy for SLIRI occupied a moral high ground that was threatening to a 
number of partners who might otherwise have been supporters. SLIRI held to its principal 
of neutrality by refusing alignments with other NGOs that operated under the authority of 
one or the other side of the conflict. This made it difficult for SLIRI to secure patrons 
since all aligned organizations have considerable stakes in remaining so and 
organizations with political stakes are reluctant to promote ones without them. Political 
stakes translate readily into funds: Government bodies are funded by their superiors who 
have their own patrons with their own stakes in a state of conflict that justifies their 
continued existence. NGOs are their clients and receive funding with the blessings of 
their patrons. Access to donors is inevitably made through those patrons who, openly or 
not, are dependent on their place in a hierarchy of affiliation.  
 
SLIRI survived in spite of its detractors. It had a reliable funder for three and a half years, 
the European Community, which looked to SLIRI to achieve the promised ideal of 
securing official recognition from both sides of the conflict. This meant receiving official 
recognition as an NGO, capable of operating independently and receiving funds on its 
own, from both the Government’s National Mine Action Organization (NMAO) and 
SPLM’s Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (SRRC). Efforts were stymied on 
both sides as neither side gave full support originally. Relations frayed between 
personalities in the heat of the effort. Finally SPLM’s SRRC, under the direction of an 
enlightened director, granted recognition, but the Government’s NMAO never has. SLIRI 
has therefore not been able to meet original expectations and become a nationwide 
indigenous and neutral mine action body. 
 
The cross-lines strategy has built relationships that otherwise would have remained 
dormant or adversarial, and in this sense, it has been efficacious. On the grander scheme, 
SLIRI remains unrecognized nationally. Perhaps this was inevitable and perhaps nothing 
more could have been done, but the fact remains that it has not met its ultimate objective.  
 
 





The institution spanned conflict lines in a number of senses. It had survey teams in both 
Government and SPLM controlled areas and its two person survey teams in the Nuba 
Mountains came from both sides of the conflict. This was testimony to its peacebuilding 
intentions and no doubt, hostilities were reduced by SLIRI presence alone. The question 
for SLIRI was not whether it was prepared to take the bold step of spanning conflict lines 
but what would be the political and financial consequences. As it turned out, SLIRI could 
not overcome the difficulties for an organization that was so squarely non-aligned and 
eventually its international partner, Landmine Action, took the regrettable but necessary 
step of withdrawing support when it became clear that it had neither the financial nor 
human resources to maintain the required level of assistance. The nobler choice for 
Landmine Action might have been to do what was necessary to make SLIRI succeed, to 
persist in its diplomatic advances, and while maintaining a modest presence in the 
clearance field, to invest more heavily in human and capital resources to strengthen 
SLIRI enough to ensure its survival.    
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SLIRI’s principal function was to collect information on landmine casualties, their 
location, circumstances and consequences. Information collection took place in two 
different periods, one less structured using protocols devised by SLIRI advisors 
themselves, and a subsequent more structured period of work carried out in collaboration 
with UNMAS Kadugli. In the first period, SLIRI assembled a network of village contacts 
from the villages surveyed and, in many of these, SLIRI identified local volunteers who 
served the village by sending and receiving information. The network grew to include 
formal links to a large number of villages and structured so that village contacts would 
report through local councils and county committees to the office in Kadugli.  
 
The network made it possible for SLIRI to proceed quickly with the second survey 
period. It also made it possible for SLIRI to deliver other kinds of services, provide 
victim assistance, make awareness programmes available and train leaders in helping 
villagers avoid injury.  
 
Although the network never became officially recognized as either an objective or an 
outcome of the project, its importance rivaled the surveys.
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 When it began, there was 
very little landmine awareness and only a handful of NGOs providing mine risk 
education. When information about a human casualty reached head office through the 
network, a Field Officer visited the village to monitor the status of the victim, provide 
assistance where needed, gather information and conduct public sessions on how to avoid 
further accidents. The disabled victim became a rallying point and participant in the 
information sessions.   
 
SLIRI’s mine risk education programme delivered through this network was the largest 
and most effective in the Nuba Mountain area and recognized as such by other NGOs. 
“When it comes to community work the most advanced is undoubtedly SLIRI who has 
established a far reaching surveillance system counting 38 local networks in mine 
contaminated communities. These networks consist of local military engineer’s village 
elders and chiefs. The local networks have the role of post incident monitoring and 
sustaining the MRE. The MRE community should follow the SLIRI example and draw 
all they can on the SLIRI competence in establishing this kind of community network to 
receive IDPs with MRE and collect information.”
25
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 Landmine Action’s Phase II European Community project executed in December 2003 with the 
European Community acknowledges the presence of these community networks as a mechanism for 
extending the scope of the programme, but they do not figure among the distinguishing features of either 
Phase I or Phase II objectives. 
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 Uliks Hasanaj and Rune Hjarno Rasmussen, MRE in the Nuba, A Survey to Assess the Need for Mine 
Risk Education in the Nuba Mountains, Kadugli:UNICEF and  DanChurchAid Mine Action Team, 2004 
KEY QUESTION: What has been the relevance of SLIRI’s programme to local 
community needs with special attention to women and disabled persons? 
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Attention was everywhere accorded to women and children, though it happened that 
women were rarely landmine victims; in fact none of the 49 landmine victims reported in 
SLIRI reports for 2004-2005 were women. A larger victim data set from DanChurchAid 
using report forms for 152 casualties registered only 6 female victims, 4 per cent of the 
total. In Nuban society, women do not engage in the most risk-inclined activities and this 
partially explains the low involvement of women in accidents and in public awareness 
campaigns. Women were therefore not singled out as dedicated targets in SLIRI’s 
community liaison programme, though they did participate in the network, worked 




SLIRI committed itself fully to focusing its mine action activities on serving community 
needs and did so innovatively, linking communities together in a network of mutual 
assistance and training local leaders on steps for reducing accidents among villagers and 
















SLIRI is Landmine Action’s brainchild. It was spawned in the course of a cross-lines 
meeting in 2001 among a number of Sudanese mine action organizations sponsored by 
Landmine Action, and the relationship between Landmine Action and SLIRI has 
continued for three and a half years. SLIRI has relied on its international partners, 
OXFAM UK and Landmine Action for its existence and now as its international 
partnerships are less certain, so SLIRI’s future has come into question.   
 
SLIRI became an increasingly complex and demanding partner after 2003. Its 
administrative and financial resources were stretched as it sought to establish itself 
nationwide putting in place a number of survey sites (Sector Operation Centres) in both 
Government controlled and SPLM controlled areas, each with a pair of surveyors and the 
required logistical resources. Landmine Action served only as technical advisor in Phase 
I of European Community funding (June 2002 – December 2003) but when Phase II was 
approved, Landmine Action assumed the functions of both technical advisor and 
international partner.  
 
The Sudanese mine action landscape was changing and becoming more challenging 
during Phase II of EC funding. There were more donor funds available for mine action 
than before and with them, competition intensified among Sudanese mine action 
organizations to capture the windfalls. SLIRI’s status as a neutral organization worried 
the politically partisan bodies – on both the Government and the SPLM sides – who had 
created mine action organizations each with grand aspirations. This meant that Landmine 
Action would have to meet its advisory obligations as well as navigate SLIRI through 
difficult political waters. These were onerous tasks.  
 
Landmine Action and SLIRI were to perform complementary functions in Phase II. 
SLIRI was to gather information on mined areas while Landmine Action, with its 
clearance “response” teams, would clear the areas that SLIRI identified as most 
contaminated. But by 2004, the administrative and political complexities of managing the 
project began to erode this complementarity. Landmine Action was making little progress 
getting SLIRI officially recognized by Government authorities and in fact, it seemed as if 
the Government was raising ever more obstacles. UNMAS took over the function of 
KEY QUESTIONS:  
1. Is the SLIRI programme sustainable once LMA has devolved full managerial 
control to the SLIRI programme? 
2. Is there potential for continuation of the programme’s impact if there is no 
further input from donors? 
3. Does the SLIRI crosslines approach offer value for money? Is it an efficient 
way to implement mine action interventions in the Nuba Mountans? 
4. Are SLIRI future strategies viable? 
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assembling information and deciding where to clear, in some instances dismissing the 
credibility of SLIRI data. At the same time, Landmine Action was forced to recognize 
that its budget was insufficient for maintaining the growing number of Sector Operations 
Centres, supporting the Nuba Mountain survey, plus training and maintaining Landmine 
Action’s own mine clearance operations.  
 
Landmine Action had to make some difficult decisions in early 2005 when EC’s second 
tranche payment was delayed and a budget crisis loomed. Landmine Action reduced its 
commitment to SLIRI’s Sector Operations Centres throughout the country. The Nuba 
Mountains office felt the cuts particularly since the Nuba Mountains SOC was on the 
verge of completing its 64 village survey of mine-affected villages in collaboration with 
UNMAS format. SLIRI’s reputation suffered when it abandoned the survey mid-stream. 
Inevitably, the reduction of Landmine Action’s financial commitment was accompanied 
by a reduction in its support, more generally, to the SLIRI ideal. Landmine Action 
focused its attention primarily on its mine clearance operations and the complementarity 
between SLIRI’s outreach activities and Landmine Action’s clearance operations 
effectively disappeared. Without funds, SLIRI’s activities came to a halt, its existence in 
jeopardy. Landmine Action took the decision to bring in a new partner, HALO Trust, to 
assume Landmine Action’s partnership role in all of SLIRI’s SOCs in the SPLM area and 
three SOCs in the Government area.  
 
SLIRI’s new partnership with HALO Trust is still being negotiated and so far, funding is 
insufficient to restore SLIRI’s activities to their previous level. As of November 2005, 
Landmine Action had withdrawn involvement from all but two sites in Government 
controlled areas, the Nuba Mountains (Kadugli) and the Blue Nile (Damazzin). SLIRI’s 
future, tenuous as it is, depends as before on decisions taken by its present and future 
international partners.  
 
SLIRI without Donor Support 
 
One of the explicit objectives of the European Community’s funding was “to ensure that 
SLIRI is a registered, independent NGO by the end of Phase II.” Whether this was ever 
feasible is another question, and opinions differ on the matter. It did not happen and even 
though many of the Phase II objectives were met, this one was not and the European 
Community may have understandably judged it impractical to invest further in SLIRI 
becoming an independent Sudanese-wide NGO. The European Community’s decision 
may have been symptomatic of the risks that many donors associate with funding a small 
NGO in the Sudan where political rivalries leave little space for an independent 
organization. Without funding, SLIRI has very little chance of surviving, except as a 
small group of volunteers.  
 
An organization like SLIRI is doubly disadvantaged. Independent as it is, it will probably 
not find a supportive niche within either the Government or the SPLM authorities. Nor is 
it likely to be an attractive investment for multilateral donors since United Nations 
agencies and organizations actively encourage bilateral donors to funnel assistance 
through United Nations organizations. SLIRI might well be adopted, in an exceptional 
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circumstance, by a sympathetic bilateral donor willing to make a long-term commitment, 
but this is somewhat unlikely. It will continue to rely on the largesse of international 
NGOs, like Landmine Action, HALO Trust perhaps and others.   
 
Why has Landmine Action not taken more substantial measures to secure SLIRI’s future 
during the recent crisis? Practical considerations probably have taken precedence over the 
ideological affinities between the two organizations. It required a strong resolve to 
support SLIRI’s non-partisan, cross-lines programme, when both the Government and the 
SPLM authorities would have preferred an organization that served one or the other of 
their separate interests. When UNMAS itself declined support for SLIRI, it required an 
even stronger resolve to keep SLIRI going. There was a change in Landmine Action 
personnel when the original advocates departed and in their place were administrators 
with less firm resolve, less stature and less of the diplomatic skill to usher SLIRI into the 
right kind of alliances and collaborations. Eventually, the practical obstacles were 
insurmountable. None of this, however, is irreversible.  
 
The Cost Effectiveness of a Cross-lines Strategy 
 
A cross-lines programme is idealistic by nature, advocating collaborative dialogue in an 
environment that is hostile and opportunistic and as such, is likely to be cost effective in 
only the most favourable circumstances. The Nuba Mountains might have been one of 
these. Parties to the conflict there were willing to endorse a cross-lines strategy and this 
meant that mine action services could be extended to a larger population than would 
otherwise be the case. There might have been some efficiency gains as a result. A cost 
effectiveness analysis might show that a mine action program in the Nuba Mountains 
with a cross-lines component generates greater economic returns on a larger scale as a 
result of a more sensitive approach to prioritization and the greater incentives it provides 
for returnees to resume their economic lives; and all this with more modest inputs than 
mine removal exercises that have little social component. Such a comparison has not 
been possible for the Nuba Mountains area though the rudiments of a cost effectiveness 
analysis are given on pages 23-24.  
 
That said, judging cross-lines programmes by their economic return probably misses the 
real merit of incorporating peacebuilding initiatives whose value is difficult to measure. 
All the more reason to applaud the European Community’s willingness to take a risk in 
supporting the Landmine/SLIRI programme knowing that the parties to the conflict in the 
Sudan were unlikely to agree on much, much less on how to implement a mine action 
programme for surveying and clearing dangerous areas. The European Community 
provided support anyway on the off chance that the programme would give a boost to 
national reconciliation. Cross-lines programmes in conflict zones are not likely to be 
chosen for their efficiency, certainly not without better odds of success than can be found 








A reputable non-partisan institution like SLIRI is essential for any peacebuilding mine 
action programme to endure beyond the support of expatriate experts and donors. SLIRI 
was originally conceived for this reason, as the long-term institutional anchor for a mine 
action programme in a post conflict country where political affiliations are both 
unavoidable and problematic. SLIRI succeeded in avoiding affiliations, but largely as a 
consequence, it has not succeeded in supporting itself either from government or 
international NGOs or donor funds. Satisfying the institutional side of sustainability has 
undermined its capacity to satisfy the financial. The fact is that SLIRI is not a very 
promising investment if the result anticipated is to create a self-sustaining, self-
supporting organization. But if seen from another perspective, which is the creation of an 
organization that stands conspicuously for a neutral, peacebuilding mine action 




SLIRI has so far achieved neither institutional permanence nor financial sustainability. A 
non-aligned organization in a post-conflict environment, where parties to the conflict 
continue to define the political landscape, are bound to have difficulty getting political 
approval. Donors are not likely to fund an organization for any period of time that, by 
virtue of its non-partisan status, goes so squarely against the political grain and therefore 
lacks political support. Without continued outside support from an organization willing to 
back an innovative mine action organization, an organization like SLIRI has little chance 




The gist of the ten recommendations that follow is for Landmine Action and other 
international partners to re-place SLIRI on a sound footing. It is in the long term interests 
of both Landmine Action, other international partners and the Sudan to restore SLIRI as a 
non-aligned indigenous mine action organization in the Sudan and to promote SLIRI’s 
involvement in information gathering, community liaison and policy setting at both 
national and regional levels.  
 
This evaluation is cognizant of the difficulties these kinds of recommendations pose. 
Landmine Action has made a decision to distance itself from SLIRI for understandable 
reasons. Potential international partners might reasonably argue that there is neither 
financial nor political support for an organization such as SLIRI and future support is 
likely to encounter the same difficulties it has in the past. But international mine action 
partners have only a limited menu of choices. One option is to withdraw from the country 
altogether leaving SLIRI to seek support as it can. Another is to provide resources 
through multilateral organizations which themselves maintain privileged links to partisan 
organizations in the country. Another is to continue supporting the modest clearance 
activities in the one or two villages which have, at best, limited impact and contribute 
little to advocating alternative mine action approaches. A fourth is to revive Landmine 
Action’s policy of providing independent support for indigenization that has the potential 
of greater social and economic impact and that contributes to advocating for innovative 
solutions to landmine contamination. As difficult as it may be, this final option appears 
the only feasible one because it gives SLIRI a distinctive niche, it builds on SLIRI’s 
strengths and it is more likely than other mine action strategies to achieve far-reaching 
benefits for peacebuilding in the Sudan.  
 
The following recommendations are designed to accomplish this overall objective. They 
do not pick up where Landmine Action left off when the unavoidable decision was taken 
to reduce support for SLIRI. They do not attempt to restore the programme pursued under 
Phase II of European Community funding. The ultimate objective of building indigenous 
capacity for mine action is the same, but these recommendations set about achieving it 
differently.  
 
Recommendation 1: The centre of operations and SLIRI’s national headquarters should 
be shifted to Kadugli in the Nuba Mountains. This locates SLIRI in more neutral 
surroundings. A modest presence might be maintained in Khartoum but only for the 
purposes of displaying results and giving briefings to national and international 
collaborators.   
 
Recommendation 2: It is imperative that the results of SLIRI’s surveys be compiled in a 
comprehensive fashion as soon as possible and be disseminated widely. This report has 
attempted to demonstrate that these results are grossly undervalued. A complete 
compilation and presentation of SLIRI’s data, along with how this data has contributed to 
making key mine action decisions, should correct this situation.  
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Recommendation 3: Every effort should be made to expand the existing deminer 
training school in Tillo outside of Kadugli into a National Mine Action Centre, possibly 
situated in an expanded complex adjacent to its present facilities. This expanded facility 
will be in a position to serve a number of functions, one of which will be to serve as 
SLIRI’s national headquarters (see Recommendation 1.). It will also provide a locus for 
coordinating advocacy efforts in the area of peacebuilding and mine action.  
 
Recommendation 4: This National Mine Action Centre should furthermore serve as one 
of the national repositories of mine action information, not supplanting UNMAS but 
complementary to it. SLIRI’s data should be analyzed and on display. The national 
IMSMA database, maintained primarily by UNMAS in Khartoum and elsewhere, should 
also be accessible with the associated facilities to produce maps, analyze data, assign 
information gathering tasks and produce regular reports on dangerous areas, casualties 
and policy issues.  
 
Recommendation 5: It should also support SLIRI’s community liaison activities through 
a network of linked communities that serves to receive information as well as disseminate 
information throughout the network. This successful innovative approach to mine action 
community liaison should be replicated in other areas of the Sudan.  
 
Recommendation 6: A further function will be to support a mine action raining facility. 
This mine action training centre should aim to be the principal school for training 
deminers in the country, the place where accreditation is given and accepted by both 
Government and SPLM. There are indications that UNMAS Kadugli would be 
supportive.  
 
Recommendation 7: While training deminers from Government and SPLM controlled 
areas in both full and refresher courses, the National Mine Action Centre should also 
offer courses to deminer candidates and to others in a broad range of mine action and 
community development competencies. These should include, at a minimum, survey 
skills, data management for mine action information, conflict resolution and community 
development programming in health, small scale finance and agricultural production.  
 
Recommendation 8: The National Mine Action Centre should be administered by SLIRI 
and be identified with SLIRI as an organization. SLIRI’s identification with this National 
Mine Action Centre will provide a justification for the Government to officially 
recognize SLIRI as a national NGO.  
 
Recommendation 9: Landmine Action mine clearance activities should be reduced to, at 
most, one full team. This mine clearance response team should be based at the training 
centre and used (1) as a training resource associated with the National Mine Action 
Centre and (2) for deployment to urgent mine clearance operations identified in 
collaboration with UNMAS.    
 
Recommendation 10: The National Mine Action Centre should undertake community 
development initiatives in the Nuba Mountains area and beyond as opportunities arise, 
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incorporating mine action into programmes for improving agricultural production, 










ANNEX 1: 64 NUBA MOUNTAINS VILLAGES SURVEYED BY SLIRI 
AUGUST-DECEMBER 2004 – A PORTION OF THE RAW DATA 
         
Sn Dname Sname vname No HH HH Affected IDPs Expected LifeThreatening No of DA's 
1 S. Kordofan Dileng Abri 125 0 4000 Yes 1 
2 S. Kordofan Dileng Abuad 150 20 2000 Yes 1 
3 S. Kordofan Dileng Al Gnei 0 0 0 Yes 2 
4 S. Kordofan Dileng Al Laghair 0 0 0 Yes 0 
5 S. Kordofan Dileng Brakandi 60 0 1000 No 1 
6 S. Kordofan Dileng Dari 100 0 4000 Yes 2 
7 S. Kordofan Dileng Dulami 450 5 7000 Yes 2 
8 S. Kordofan Dileng Julud 2000 10 5000 Yes 3 
9 S. Kordofan Dileng Kabila 92 0 300 No 0 
10 S. Kordofan Dileng Kalandi 0 0 10000 Yes 3 
11 S. Kordofan Dileng Katla 400 50 400 Yes 5 
12 S. Kordofan Dileng Magda 0 0 0 Yes 1 
13 S. Kordofan Dileng Nieil 165 0 72000 No 0 
14 S. Kordofan Dileng Tukma 0 0 0 No 0 
15 S. Kordofan Dileng Wali 3000 40 5000 Yes 9 
16 S. Kordofan Kadugli Abu Snoon 500 0 3000 No 1 
17 S. Kordofan Kadugli Addar 2000 0 1000 Yes 1 
18 S. Kordofan Kadugli Agab 52 0 200 Yes 2 
19 S. Kordofan Kadugli Al Azraq 500 20 5000 Yes 1 
20 S. Kordofan Kadugli Andulo 275 30 500 Yes 1 
21 S. Kordofan Kadugli Angulo 0 0 0 No 0 
22 S. Kordofan Kadugli Atmor 833 0 500 No 0 
23 S. Kordofan Kadugli AtTaiss 833 50 1200 Yes 5 
24 S. Kordofan Kadugli Bilynga 182 18 300 Yes 1 
25 S. Kordofan Kadugli Boram 1666 0 2000 Yes 1 
26 S. Kordofan Kadugli Dabakia 583 20 1000 Yes 1 
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27 S. Kordofan Kadugli Daliuka 300 0 1500 No 0 
28 S. Kordofan Kadugli Damba 300 0 3000 No 0 
29 S. Kordofan Kadugli Damik 1831 0 5000 No 3 
30 S. Kordofan Kadugli Eiri 2660 10 5000 Yes 4 
31 S. Kordofan Kadugli Fama 1500 0 4000 Yes 2 
32 S. Kordofan Kadugli Ganaya 800 25 2000 Yes 2 
33 S. Kordofan Kadugli Heiban 833 30 1000 Yes 3 
34 S. Kordofan Kadugli Karkar 700 0 3000 No 0 
35 S. Kordofan Kadugli Karkaria 833 0 5000 No 0 
36 S. Kordofan Kadugli Katsha 1299 100 6000 Yes 8 
37 S. Kordofan Kadugli Kauda 700 0 2000 No 1 
38 S. Kordofan Kadugli Kiga Al Kheil 322 20 1800 No 3 
39 S. Kordofan Kadugli Kofa 97 0 3000 No 1 
40 S. Kordofan Kadugli Koyea 0 0 0 Yes 0 
41 S. Kordofan Kadugli Krongo 950 22 3000 Yes 5 
42 S. Kordofan Kadugli Kubang 567 0 345 Yes 2 
43 S. Kordofan Kadugli Kulolo 520 0 1600 Yes 3 
44 S. Kordofan Kadugli Miri Juwa 78 0 1000 No 1 
45 S. Kordofan Kadugli New Masakin 100 0 500 No 0 
46 S. Kordofan Kadugli Ragafi 500 30 5000 Yes 1 
47 S. Kordofan Kadugli Rieka 166 50 4000 Yes 1 
48 S. Kordofan Kadugli Sama 150 0 2000 Yes 2 
49 S. Kordofan Kadugli Shat Damam 450 20 1200 No 3 
50 S. Kordofan Kadugli Shatel Sufya 1833 30 5000 Yes 3 
51 S. Kordofan Kadugli Taballa 927 0 927 Yes 1 
52 S. Kordofan Kadugli Tabania 1000 20 5000   4 
53 S. Kordofan Kadugli Tangal 3000 0 8000 Yes 2 
54 S. Kordofan Kadugli Trogi 1750 5 0 Yes 3 
55 S. Kordofan Kadugli Um Durain 166 25 500 Yes 5 
56 S. Kordofan Kadugli Um Serdiba 700 50 5000 Yes 3 
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57 S. Kordofan Kadugli UM Suran 30 0 2 Yes 1 
58 W. Kordofan Lagawa Nimir Shago 100 0 50 No 0 
59 W. Kordofan Lagawa Raafo 0 0 0 No 0 
60 W. Kordofan Lagawa Ras Al Fil 133 0 1500 No 1 
61 W. Kordofan Lagawa Saada 490 0 4000 No 1 
62 W. Kordofan Lagawa Safaria 367 0 2000 No 1 
63 W. Kordofan Lagawa Suelogi 6500 0 2000 No 1 
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Annex 4: Abbreviations 
 
AP  Anti-personnel (mines) 
AT  Anti-tank (mines) 
DCA   DanChurchAid 
DDR   Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
EOD   Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
ERW  Explosive Remnants of War 
GPS   Global Positioning System 
IDP  Internally Displaced Person 
IRIN  Integrated Regional Information Network (humanitarian news agency) 
IMSMA  Information Management System for Mine Action 
JASMAR  Sudan Association for Combating Landmines (Government affiliated) 
JMC   Joint Military Commission – peacekeeping force in the Nuba Mountains 
LMA   Landmine Action 
MRE  Mine Risk Education 
NMAO (Government) National Mine Action Office 
NPA   Norwegian People’s Aid 
OSIL  Operation Save Innocent Lives (SPLM affiliated) 
SALW  Small Arms and Light Weapons 
SCBL   Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines 
SLIRI   Sudan Landmines Information and Response Initiative 
SLR   Sudan Landmines Response 
SOC   Sector Operation Centres (SLIRI survey sites throughout the country 
SPLA   Sudan Peoples Liberation Army 
SPLM   Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement 
SRRC  Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Committee 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNMAS  United Nations Mine Action Service 
UNMIS  United Nations Mission in the Sudan 



















Annex 5: Contacts and Interviews 
 
 
Landmine Action - UK 
Richard Moyes  Policy and Research Manager, Landmine Action, UK 
Simon Conway   Acting Director, Landmine Action, UK 
Dan Ayliffe   Programme Manager, Sudan, Landmine Action, UK 
 
Other International NGOs 
James Murray   Programme Manager, Comic Relief, UK 
Mike Kendellen   Director of Sudan Survey, Survey Action Centre, US 
 
Government of Sudan 
Hamid Ahmed Abdelaleem Director, National Mine Action Office, Khartoum 
Alfatah Ali Ismail  Director, Humanitarian Affairs Commission and Sudan  
    Relief and Rehabilitation Committee, Kadugli 
Abdul Munim Al Taib Wali/Governor, South Kordofan, Nuba Mountains 
 
Landmine Action, Sudan 
Patrick McLeish  Country Director, Landmine Action, Sudan 
Rae McGrath    Previous Director, Landmine Action, UK and Sudan 
Jez Lockett   Technical Advisor, Landmine Action, Sudan 
David Elliott    Technical Advisor, Landmine Action, Sudan 
 
Sudan Landmine Information Response Initiative 
Mohamed Fawz Mohamed Programme Coordinator, SLIRI Sudan 
Aziza Farah   Programme Monitor, SLIRI Sudan  
Asha Babala Adam  Assistant Field Officer, SLIRI, Kadugli 
Nadir Phillip Kadou  Field Officer, SLIRI, Kadugli 
Simon Jundi    Previous Field Officer, SLIRI, Kadugli 
 
United Nations 
Jim Pansegrouw  CTA Program Manager, United Nations Mine Action  
    Office, Khartoum 
Mohammed Kabir  Senior Data Management Advisor, United Nations Mine  
    Action Office, Khartoum 
Qadeem Khan Tariq  Senior Technical Advisor, Mine Action Service, United  
    Nations Development Program   
Sherif Baaser    Project Officer and Coordinator, Mine Risk Education,  
    United Nations Children Fund 
Ahmed Gangari  Mine Risk Education Technical Advisor, United Nations  
    Children Fund 
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Angus MacMillan   Quality Assurance Officer, Nuba Region United Nations  
    Mine Action Office, Kadugli 
Jan Bosman    Programme Manager, Nuba Region United Nations Mine  
    Action Office, Kadugli 
Boutros Obidka  Regional Coordinator, Mine Risk Education, United  
    Nations Mine Action Office 
 
Other 
Bob Scott   Programme Director, DanChurchAid, Um Sediba, Nuba  
    Mountains  
Abdelati Abdelkheir Eid Coordinator, Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines,   
    Khartoum 
Abo-Osama Abd Allah  Executive Director, Sudanese Association for Combating 
    Landmines (JASMAR) 
 
 
